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Abstract
Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that tradi-
tions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood
as ‘living’ entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially
valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of
thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the
concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the
authentic continuation of a tradition. It is argued that the ways of thinking and acting that
constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition –
stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this
account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among
rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making.
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Enlightenment rationalists considered traditions to be obstacles to the development of
true knowledge and good social order. Traditions, they suggested, are shackles of the
past that prevent people from moving on and realizing justice. Policy-making should
bow to the authority of reason, not the force of habit. According to Popper, rationalists
had taken too easy a way out. While traditions cannot replace normative reasoning in
policy-making, he argued (Popper, 1972), it would be reckless to discard them out of
hand as the irrational remnants of primitive societies. What we need, Popper claimed, is a
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rational theory of tradition; a theory that manages to rescue traditions from the tradi-
tionalists and, to some extent, rationality from the rationalists.
Popper’s article, ‘Towards a rational theory of tradition’ marks a watershed in scho-
larly debate about tradition because ever since, or so it seems, the task is generally
understood as one of overcoming the dichotomy of traditionality and rationality, of
formed ways of thinking and acting, on the one hand, and abstract normative reasoning,
on the other. More specifically, Popper and later scholars following this path have argued
that traditions may serve valuable functions for private and public life by, for instance:
providing guidance concerning the timing and manner of complying with imperfect
duties articulated by philosophical principles;
creating a ‘home’ in time and enacting (as well as assuring oneself of) one’s individual
or collective self-persistence;
embodying and entrenching habits as well as social conventions;
serving as containers for practical knowledge and accumulated historical experience
(‘wisdom’); or
guiding laws, as long as the legal regime conforms to traditions people will accept
them as a form of legitimate authority.1
Following Scheffler, I conceive of traditions as sets of beliefs, customs, teachings,
values, practices, or procedures that are transmitted from generation to generation (cf.
Scheffler, 2010: 290). This understanding is broad enough to capture macro-cultural
phenomena that contributions akin to communitarianism consider paradigmatic such as
national traditions (e.g. Wall, 2015), even though perhaps not quite rationalities (e.g.
MacIntyre, 1997). However, to reduce complexity, this article illustrates its argument
mostly by reference to micro-cultural phenomena that partially rather than holistically
regulate private and public life, such as the bequest of dress watches by heads of families
to their descendants, marriage, Christian caritas, and Hegelianism. As far as I can see,
this methodological decision greatly facilitates comprehension without simplifying mat-
ters in a meaningful way.
The aim of this article is to develop an informative understanding of the authentic
continuation of tradition.2 The article therefore deals with the flipside of the already
ample scholarship on factitious continuity claims, i.e. the ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobs-
bawm, 1983), and indirectly comments on it. This choice of focus is motivated by the
fact that the two models for the authentic continuation of a tradition that can be found in
the literature are both wanting. The first model suggests that members of a later gener-
ation must have the same set of beliefs (or customs, etc.) as the members of the previous
generation to be faithful inheritors of their tradition (Hobsbawm, 1983: 2; Pieper, 2010).
This understanding appears to be under-inclusive because the underlying causal-identity
criterion allows for neither intra- nor inter-generational variance in the relevant set of
beliefs (or customs, etc.). The second model suggests that traditions are capable of
accommodating changes in their meaning over time as well as withstanding disagree-
ment over their meaning among simultaneously existing adherents (e.g. MacIntyre,
1992: 222; Oakeshott, 1965, 1991; Wall, 2015: 4). Usually, very little is said about why,
how, how much, and in regard to what such inter- and intra-generational heterogeneity is
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permissible. If a criterion is explicitly given, then it is causal similarity.3 This criterion,
however, appears to be over-inclusive and arbitrary as it permits any modification in a
given set of beliefs (or customs, etc.) as long as this set develops slowly over time.
Hence, there is a need for a more informative formal understanding of the act of authen-
tically continuing a tradition and the act of breaking with it. The lack of conceptual
clarity also inhibits our understanding of the normativity of tradition, which constitutes a
second shortcoming of the existing literature: while most theorists favour the second
model that considers traditions to be ‘living’ entities, they assign roles to traditions (see
the above list) that tend to require stasis and concurrence in ways of thinking and acting.
Intra- and inter-generational variation in the meaning of traditions quite obviously seems
to be negatively correlated with the socially valuable functions that traditions are sup-
posed to serve. This tension has not been sufficiently discussed so far, and neither has it
been considered whether any positive effects result from the ‘living’ nature of traditions.
To address these desiderata, the first section takes Popper’s ‘Towards a rational
theory of tradition’ as a starting point. The two shortcomings of the existing literature
are reflected in, if not inspired by, Popper’s ambiguous characterization of traditions as
both uniform and heterogeneous. I then distinguish the two existing models of traditions
and show why they are wanting. The third section develops an alternative model of
tradition that requires causal equivalence of the overall point or purpose of the set(s) of
beliefs (or customs, etc.) among faithful members of a tradition. It suggests that tradi-
tions not only may but in fact must change as time goes by, namely, in such a way as to
counterbalance relevant changes in the individuals’ respective contexts of living. The
fourth section examines how this alternative understanding shapes our understanding of
the functions of traditions, focusing in particular on their role in policy-making. Given
that traditions divide their adherents as much as they attune their ways of thinking and
acting, I conclude that some socially valuable functions that frequently are attributed to
traditions must be relativized. However, the proposed conception suggests positively,
and somehow unexpectedly, that traditions can serve as catalysts for institutional reform.
Popper’s reappraisal of traditions
In 1948, Popper (1972: 120–1) expressed the concern that rationalists since the Enlight-
enment had kept a self-refuting ‘traditional attitud[e] towards the problem of tradition’.
They simply assumed, without actually scrutinizing this assumption, that traditions were
detrimental to attempts to develop a good social order. To overcome this self-refuting
attitude and ward off the challenge posed by (neo-)traditionalists such as Burke, Hayek,
and Oakeshott, Popper reflected on the cornerstones of a rational theory of tradition.4
This section recalls his reflections, showing how Popper attempts to reconcile formed
ways of thinking and acting with abstract reasoning, but still leaves important questions
concerning traditions unanswered.
A basic outlook that Popper shares with (neo-)traditionalists is the view that social
order consists in an immensely intricate web of functionally interdependent regulations
and arrangements. Traditions are a major and indispensable part of this intricate web.
They almost always come into being as unintended by-products of action, with Popper
noting that many of them will be imperfect. They may include inappropriate beliefs
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about the world and call for the performance of unjust acts. Yet regardless of whether
they are particularly appropriate and just, traditions as such bring order and continuity to
an otherwise chaotic world, as well as predictability, and thus facilitate individual and
collective rational action:
We should be anxious, terrified, and frustrated, and we could not live in the social world, did
it not contain a considerable amount of order, a great number of regularities to which we can
adjust ourselves. The mere existence of these regularities is perhaps more important than
their peculiar merits or demerits. They are needed as regularities, and therefore handed on as
traditions. (Popper, 1972: 130)
Two functions of traditions emerge from Popper’s characterization at this point. Using
Scheffler’s (2010: 291) distinction, we can say that traditions, for Popper, embody and
entrench social conventions as well as collective habits. Whereas social conventions
(e.g. red traffic lights used as stop signs) foster the coordination of behaviour, collective
habits allow people to gain ‘deliberative efficiency’ in that they equip the members of a
new generation with tacit knowledge and habitual practices without their having to
become active and waste scarce resources reflecting on every course of action in which
they must engage daily.
Since particular traditions may be unjust or inadequate, Popper affirms, it is necessary
to question them by employing the independent criterion of normative principles. If a
tradition is found to be wanting, one might consider replacing it with another trans-
planted from somewhere else. Substituting it with a newly invented construct is not a
viable option in Popper’s view.5 As a result, rationality is neither the enemy of nor a
substitute for traditions; it is primarily a tool for making good selections from the various
particular traditions that have brought order to social life at different times and in
different places (Popper, 1972: 122, 132).
Besides showing that traditions enhance ordered social life and proposing a view that
reconciles traditions and rationality, Popper tried to specify the relationship between
traditions and institutions. Whereas traditions ‘describe a uniformity of people’s atti-
tudes, or ways of behaviour, or aims or values, or tastes’ (p. 133), Popper proposes that
we understand institutions as
(changing) bod[ies] of people [that] observe a certain set of norms or fulfil certain prima
facie social functions (such as teaching, policing . . . ) which serve certain prima facie social
purposes (such as the propagation of knowledge, or protection from violence). (p. 133)
A permanent danger for institutions, Popper suggests, is that persons run them in such a
way as to serve their own purposes. Officers may accept bribes and thus participate in
crime rather than preventing and prosecuting them, while teachers may propagate per-
sonal opinions instead of knowledge. Traditions are intermediaries, Popper suggests, that
push personnel towards running institutions properly: ‘[T]he long-term ‘‘proper’’ func-
tioning of institutions depends mainly upon . . . traditions. It is tradition which gives the
persons (who come and go) that background and that certainty of purpose which resist
corruption’ (p. 134). The logic of Popper’s argument here parallels a point made in legal
494 European Journal of Social Theory 20(4)
philosophy concerning customary law and the benefits of a tradition-oriented approach
in legislation. Laws that are disconnected from traditions possess little authority. They
may command obedience, but ‘will lack what Hart calls the ‘‘internal aspect’’ of rules:
such laws will just not serve as standards by which members of the community judge
behaviour in terms of right or wrong’ (Nyı´ri, 1995: 24).
With this, Popper had made a considerable step towards a rational theory of tradition.
Yet it is worthwhile pointing out a tension in his implicit and explicit depictions of the
characteristics of traditions because it is reflected in much of the existing literature on the
subject. On the one hand, Popper frequently suggests that traditions are uniform and
static entities. He understands that adherents to a tradition share those ways of thinking
and acting that are called for by that tradition. Because traditions attune the behaviour of
individuals within and across generations they can serve the function of embodying and
entrenching social conventions and collective habits. He also says that the critical
assessment of a tradition may lead to its acceptance or rejection, but not to its modifica-
tion. That a tradition is altered ‘happens only very rarely’ (Popper, 1972: 125), but if it
happens, he says, we experience the creation of a new tradition rather than the continua-
tion of an existing one. Thus, traditions are depicted as non-changing entities.
On the other hand, however, there is some reason to believe that Popper, if pressed,
would not insist on this portrayal. His analogies to scientific theories suggest that
traditions actually come in many, slightly diverging, versions and are occasionally
developed further. He also remarks at one point that something (hence, not everything)
of a tradition founder’s attitude is preserved in later generations’ ways of thinking and
acting, from which one might take that the sets of beliefs, customs, teachings, values,
practices, or procedures acquired by adherents to a tradition merely overlap, rather than
coincide. Not least, Popper notes in passing that ‘we naturally speak of living tradi-
tions’ (1972: 127, 133).
Perhaps Popper means that traditions inform contemporaries more or less identi-
cally even though they evolve over time. But this would still raise a few questions: how
much may a tradition be modified by a later generation before it has effectively been
abandoned? What criterion allows us to distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible modifications? How much of the founder’s attitude must persist in later
generations’ ways of thinking and acting to qualify as an authentic continuation of a
tradition. Will traditions, if their meaning changes over time, still warrant the long-
term proper functioning of institutions? And if not, might they be of relevance for
institutions in other ways?
Such questions are neither sufficiently answered in ‘Towards a rational theory of
tradition’, nor, as far as I can see, by later contributions to the debate. To provide the
ground for answering them and taking Popper’s project one step further, we need to
analyse and distinguish different models of tradition in detail.
Models of traditions
Tradition, as a descriptive category, is often used to signify a set of beliefs, customs,
teachings, values, practices, or procedures (or any combination of these) that is trans-
mitted from generation to generation. The term, however, is frequently employed with
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differing meanings in the literature. For instance, ‘tradition’ is also used to characterize a
set of beliefs (or customs, etc.) that people once held, the act of transmitting such a set or
the overall process of handing it down, the process by which we have acquired certain
beliefs (or customs, etc.), or the result of having internalized these. These meanings
ought to be disambiguated. To do this, it is helpful to consider the threefold valence of
the verb ‘to hand down’ (or ‘to pass on’): somebody hands something down to someone
else. Put more technically, a tradent (T) passes on some tradition material (M) to a
recipient (R). Following Dittmann (2004: 326), I will call a single act of such transmis-
sion a tradition act. A tradition, I suggest, requires at least one successful tradition act.
By analysing the three elements that constitute a tradition act, we shall see what exactly
this implies.
A tradition material can, in principle, be anything: a belief, custom, teaching, practice,
or procedure, but seemingly also a material object such as a dress watch that is passed on
from parents to descendants. (An advertisement for a Swiss watch manufacturer reads
accordingly ‘Begin your own tradition: You never actually own a Patek Philippe, you
merely look after it for the next generation’). Yet, as Shils has convincingly argued, even
in the case of a material object, the decisive point is that a tradition material presents or
implies ‘patterns or images of actions . . . and the beliefs requiring, recommending, reg-
ulating, permitting, or prohibiting the re-enactment of those patterns’ (1981: 12). It is not
the dress watch itself that is the tradition material but rather the practice of making, the
ceremony accompanying, and the considerations motivating such a transfer, for instance,
the symbolic preparation of children for adult roles.6
A recipient is an agent who receives a tradition material. He or she may hand it down
in turn, yet may also fail or refuse to do so; and if an entire generation of recipients of a
tradition material happens to fail or refuse to hand it down, the tradition comes to an end.
While the recipient of a tradition can become a tradent or not, any tradent of a tradition
material must necessarily have been a recipient before. Were this not the case, he or she
would not hand the tradition material down, but rather over. Somewhat special is the
category of the originator (O) of a tradition. The originator is a person, group, or actant
who voluntarily or involuntarily transmits some of his/her/its peculiar ways of thinking
or acting to somebody. The originator of a tradition precedes the first tradition act by
really handing over, rather than down, the tradition material. But this means that he/she/it
will be an originator of a tradition only if the first recipient passes it on (otherwise,
nothing has been handed down by somebody to somebody else). Thus, the originator of a
tradition is an ex post facto category. A father may try to start a tradition when giving a
luxury dress watch to his child and be retrospectively glorified as the ‘founder’ of the
tradition. But this father has no control over whether his child passes on the dress watch
to his or her descendant. Traditions do not come into being by invention; they require one
successful tradition act.7
The static model of a tradition
The basic model of a tradition takes the form of a one–one chain of transmission in
that the different generations of recipients and tradents each comprise a single agent
(Figure 1).
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But traditions are social phenomena that include vast numbers of recipients and
tradents within each generation. Accordingly, it could be understood as taking the
following (slightly simplified) form (Figure 2).
I call this model the ‘static’ model of a tradition for reasons that will shortly become
clear. It takes the form of a one–many chain of transmission: a generation of recipients
acquires a tradition material and passes it on (even though not every member has to
participate) to another generation of recipients. The tradition material in the chain of
transmission is conceived in terms of causal (numerical) identity. Hence, while the
recipients and tradents are many, the tradition material is one, and it is one and the same
for each link of the chain of transmission. All faithful members of the tradition share the
same set of beliefs, customs, teachings, practices, or procedures.
Besides Hobsbawm (1983: 2), who considers invariance the defining feature of tradi-
tions,8 Pieper (2010) advocates this model, at least with regard to religious traditions.
Alluding to the once popular view that certain elements of the Christian doctrine are not
included in the Bible but have been orally handed down from Jesus to his disciples
(Kampling, 1991: 174–8), he likens the transmission of tradition materials to initiation
rites: tradents are custodians of a tradition material; recipients submit to their authority.
The point is not to discuss a topic but to inject (holy) knowledge: one person talks, the
Figure 1. Basic model of a tradition.
Figure 2. The static model of a tradition.
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other listens. And the recipient does not even need to understand what he (or she) is being
taught, but just to believe what the tradent himself (or herself) was told to believe. The
recipient, Pieper says, is neither a conversation partner nor student of the earlier tradent
or the originator of the tradition material, neither an equal nor contemporary, but a
‘disciple (‘Ju¨nger’) and heir to whom the tradition will be entrusted in the future. That
is why Paul calls those who accept his message his ‘sons’ (Pieper, 2010: 11). In con-
sequence, a tradition act according to the static conception is successful if the tradendum
becomes a traditum: that is, what (from the perspective of the originator or earlier
tradent) was supposed to be handed down must actually be handed down. Any mismatch
between tradendum and traditum means that the ‘disciples’ have not listened carefully
enough. The tradition act has failed (Pieper, 2010: 9–22).
I have presented this static model in the strictest possible form. A more moderate
version could allow for some variation in the tradition material, and replace numerical
identity with qualitative identity. Accordingly, adherents to the tradition would just share
a common core of beliefs (or customs, etc.). The Traditionskern (i.e. kernel of the
tradition material) would have to be one and the same for all recipients and tradents,
but they could diverge from each other (intra- and inter-generationally) in regard to the
margins of the tradition material. Still, there is no substantial difference between this
more moderate and the strict version of the static model. In fact, Pieper could easily
admit that only the Traditionskern of a tradition material constitutes the tradendum.
The static model certainly captures the self-understanding of many orthodox mem-
bers of religious traditions. Moreover, as we saw in the previous section, Popper also
seems to embrace it when associating traditions with uniformity and stasis in behavioural
patterns. And given that uniformity and/or stasis is also presupposed by most socially
valuable functions that are attributed to traditions in the literature, it is fair to say that the
static model enjoys a certain popularity also outside of scholarship on religious tradi-
tions. However, while it is easy to understand why orthodox members of religious
traditions will often consider the absence of alteration a constitutive feature of (their)
tradition, it is not readily clear why a rational theory of tradition should rely on it.
If a tradition material is presupposed to be of sacred origin, it ought not to be changed
because of its origin, and perhaps it has a better chance of remaining unchanged if
recipients do not even try to make sense of it.9 However, in the debate about the
normativity of tradition, sets of secular beliefs (or customs, etc.) are also understood
as tradition materials, no special authority is attributed to the originators of traditions
materials (especially if, as Popper stresses, tradition materials usually emerge uninten-
tionally), and deviation from a tradition is not considered a vice by definition. Why, then,
should we believe that tradition materials (or Traditionskerne) ought – and could pos-
sibly – be the same for all adherents to a tradition and remain unchanged over time?
The model of a living tradition
An alternative to the static model provides that the tradition material (or Traditionskern)
internalized by the various recipients may in some way differ among each other and
change over time. By speaking of ‘living tradition’, I refer to such an understanding.10
Here, tradition takes the form of a many–many chain of transmission: there is more than
498 European Journal of Social Theory 20(4)
one co-existing recipient and tradent, and the sets of beliefs (or customs, etc.) that
faithful members of the tradition hold may differ in certain regards. Preliminarily, we
can adopt Payton’s (2013) criterion for faithful membership in a tradition, which requires
a very high degree of qualitative similarity. Accordingly, the tradition material of one
generation of recipients needs to be (only) qualitatively similar, to a very high degree, to
the preceding generation’s tradition material. The tradition material received by simul-
taneously existing adherents may also merely display a high degree of qualitative simi-
larity among one another. Figure 3 illustrates this model of a living tradition. Recalling
the dress watch example, we might imagine that one group of recipients takes the
original tradition material (M) as prescribing that the dress watch be handed down to
the first-born child (M’a), a second group of recipients understands that a dress watch
should be given to each child (M’b), whereas a third recipient thinks that the dress watch
must be transmitted only to the first-born son (M’c). In Figure 3, the third recipient does
not have any sons, and therefore cannot carry on the tradition.11
Dynamic persistence
The model of a living tradition might fit the purposes of a rational theory of tradition
better than the static model. It is also tempting to reduce the latter’s relevance to an
‘internal’ perspective on tradition that captures the self-understanding of members, and
associate the former with an ‘external’ perspective on tradition that represents the
standpoint of normative reason.12 Yet, Popper seems to express a widespread intuition
when stating that we experience the creation of a new tradition rather than the continua-
tion of an existing one, if a tradition material is modified (Popper, 1972: 125). Thus, we
must assess whether the model of a living tradition that is based on the qualitative
similarity criterion can be justified vis-a`-vis the static model, and is, generally speaking,
Figure 3. The model of a living tradition.
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informative. Even if it were informative, we should still prefer, and therefore reflect
upon, a conception of living tradition that stands a chance of conciliating internal and
external perspectives (cf. Weber, 2015: 9).13 This section develops a theoretical justifi-
cation for intra- and inter-generational alterations in tradition materials that do not affect
the tradition’s authentic persistence over time, and argues that we should replace qua-
litative similarity as criterion for the authentic continuation of a tradition by qualitative
equivalence.
The model of a living tradition suggests that rivals in a dispute over authenticity (such
as Shia and Sunni Muslims, Catholic and Protestant Christians, Stalinist and Trotskyist
Communists, or Left and Right Hegelians) can be equally faithful adherents to one and
the same tradition. Such rivals might share the beliefs a, b, and g, yet whereas one rival
adds d, the other embraces E. According to the static model, only one of them can be
right. After all, rivals in disputes over authenticity typically hold that their adversaries
get the tradition material fundamentally wrong. (That is, the rivals disagree about
whether d or E is a constitutive part of the tradendum, and if neither d or E is a constitutive
part of the tradendum, then both rivals have thoroughly misunderstood the true meaning
of the tradition material.) Reception theory offers a good reason to favour the model of a
living tradition in this regard: tradition materials are polysemic, just like texts in the
narrow sense of the word; they lack a discrete and objective structure of signification
(Eco, 1979; Holub, 1984). Thus, the meaning of a tradition material (or text) is pre-
structured, but not entirely pre-determined, by its originator (or author). Recipients
necessarily play a co-constitutive role in the creation of meaning by resolving ambigu-
ities and specifying vagueness in some form or another. The process of internalization of
a tradition material, therefore, is one of making sense rather than one of listening.
Recipients are active interpreters, not passive ‘Ju¨nger’ – regardless of whether they are
consciously aware of their active role in receiving tradition materials.14 In consequence,
there is always more than one conceivable way of carrying on a tradition. Two or more
persons can be equally faithful adherents of one and the same tradition despite having
diverging understandings of the tradition material.
However, the criterion of qualitative similarity allows for greater modifications in the
tradition material than can be justified by recourse to reception theory. Instead of merely
resolving ambiguities and specifying vagueness, a recipient could say that she passes on
Hegelianism except for one central line of thought. Qualitative similarity would still
apply. Moreover, the recipient could decide to single out one line of thought by lottery.
The deliberate arbitrariness by which an element of the original tradition material would
then be abandoned apparently violates the value of authenticity. In addition to that, the
qualitative similarity criterion turns out to be over-inclusive once a long-term perspec-
tive is taken in. Qualitative similarity, on Payton’s (2013: 43) account, is required only
between consecutive but not distant links in the chain of transmission.15 In consequence,
a late recipient might not share a single aspect of the original tradition material. Figure 4
illustrates this possible long-term consequence.
Doubts arise as to whether the concept of tradition, thus understood, could still be
useful.16 Arguably, we would just formalize the fate that the transmission of beliefs (or
customs, etc.) typically suffers in situations where recipients either lack efficient means
(as e.g. in pre-literate societies) or the intent (as e.g. in a ‘whisper down the line’) to pass
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on the original message. For situations of the first kind we should be able to say that a
tradition was lost, and for situations of the second kind, that the tradition was deliberately
abandoned. The question of efficient means needs no further discussion for the present
purposes. But the presence of some conservative intent appears to be important for a
meaningful conception of tradition. Otherwise we would have to conclude that two
diverging doctrines are the material of one and the same tradition whenever they are
qualitatively similar to a very high degree and stand in a causal relationship to each
other. Perhaps it is true that atheism developed out of Christianity and that their
morality differs only slightly when compared with other creeds (Bloch, 2009). To
claim that atheism and Christianity are therefore one and the same tradition, as does
Zˇizˇek (2012: 115), appears excessive.17
To build the conservative intent that appears to be important for a meaningful con-
ception of tradition into the model, I propose to replace qualitative similarity with
equivalence.18 That is, a tradition act is successful if the set of beliefs, (or customs, etc.)
held by recipients/tradents has the same overall point or prima facie purpose in the
recipients’/tradents’ respective contexts of living. This allows us to explain why a
recipient’s tradition material (M’) may, under certain conditions, differ from the tra-
dent’s version (M) but nevertheless be true to it and in some sense even be the same, as
well as how and how much M’ may legitimately differ from M. The guiding idea is that a
later generation must express its continuing fidelity to an earlier tradition material by the
identical tradition material (M ¼ M’) if the context of living has not changed signifi-
cantly, whereas it has to express its continuing fidelity to this earlier tradition material by
a distinct tradition material (M 6¼ M’) if the context of living has actually changed in
relevant aspects. Whereas in the former case, any modification (that goes beyond the
resolution of vagueness and specification of ambiguities) of the tradition material would
mean betraying the tradition, in the latter case, substantial modifications (apart from
resolving vagueness and specifying ambiguities) must be made to counterbalance the
changes in the respective contexts of living. The point of reference for such necessary
Figure 4. Long-term consequences of the qualitative-similarity criterion.
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substantial modifications by the recipient, to repeat, is the overall point or prima facie
purpose of the original tradition material, not – what Hobsbawm (1983: 6) observed is
typical of invented traditions – some extrinsic ideological objective.
To see why the authentic continuation of a tradition requires a context-sensitive
reception of its tradition material, another analogy with the interpretation of texts is
helpful. A reader of an Italian Renaissance text who conducts a text-immanent analysis
of its propositional content is vulnerable to anachronisms. He or she must take language
change into account and interpret the text in the light of the vernacular and intellectual
conventions in use back then (Skinner, 2002: Chapters 1, 2). Just as a historical text
requires re-contextualization to grasp its meaning, so a predecessor’s tradition material
needs be updated to have the same prima facie purpose under a changed context of
living. Technological, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and arguably all kinds
of external developments may after all affect the role that a tradition material plays in
one’s life. The right to keep and bear arms, as stated in the Second Amendment to the US
Constitution, is likely to have had a different prima facie purpose before a regular army
and police force was established. The legal duty to carry arms outside settlements, as
required in Svalbard, would mean something completely different if climate change
exacerbated and destroyed the natural habitat of polar bears.
In sum, a faithful member of a tradition must re-create the tradition material in such a
way that it (in)forms the ways of thinking and acting of the present generation of
recipients in the face of their current context of living, just as the tradition material
(in)formed the preceding generation’s ways of thinking and acting in their historical
circumstances. Formally expressed, we can say that the model of tradition that builds
upon the qualitative equivalence criterion holds that a recipient authentically continues a
tradition iff (1) there is some tradition founder who originates M; (2) the recipient
receives M directly or indirectly from the tradition founder; (3) the recipient develops
M’ because (in a causal sense) of M; and (4) M’ is qualitatively equivalent to M, in the
sense that the recipient’s modifications of M are limited to resolved ambiguities and
specified vagueness, as well as actualizations designed to counterbalance the relevant
changes in conditions of living that occurred in the meantime.
This model of tradition avoids the problem of under-inclusiveness from which the
static model with its identity criterion suffers: it allows for significant intra- and inter-
generational heterogeneity of tradition materials, and shows in what sense it is not
meaningless to say that a tradition material can persist as one and the same (namely,
context-sensitively viewed), even though it varies (namely, context-independently
viewed) among simultaneously existing members of a tradition as well as across gen-
erations. On the other hand, the proposed model avoids the aforementioned problems
that are associated with models relying on the qualitative similarity criterion: it avoids
over-inclusiveness by ruling out deliberate arbitrariness and by integrating conservative
intent. Two doctrines can be the subject of two rather than one tradition even though they
are qualitatively similar to a very high degree and one of them was developed because (in
a causal sense) of the other. Moreover, it allows for the possibility that some set of beliefs
(or customs, etc.) authentically carries on a tradition even though it is dissimilar to earlier
versions. After all, recipients are supposed to counterbalance relevant circumstantial
change, and if the circumstances since the originator’s (or even the preceding recipient’s)
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times have changed dramatically, the modifications of the tradition material will have to
be dramatic, too.
To illustrate the peculiarity of the proposed model of tradition, consider a variant of
the aforementioned case of atheism. Is an atheist, who developed his or her ‘humanism’
out of Christian caritas, an authentic adherent to the Christian tradition?19 The qualita-
tive similarity model suggests that the atheist is a faithful member of the Christian
tradition, provided that his or her humanism displays a very high degree of similarity
to caritas. The static model suggests that the correct answer depends on whether the
acknowledgment of God’s existence is essential for the understanding of the original
version of caritas. If it is, the atheist is no authentic adherent because he or she denies
God’s existence. If it is not, the atheist’s humanism might well preserve the tradendum of
caritas (and Christian believers misunderstand the real meaning of caritas if they took
the acknowledgment of God’s existence to be essential). Now, the proposed model with
the qualitative equivalence criterion understands that the correct answer may well
depend on the importance of the acknowledgment of God’s existence for the true mean-
ing of caritas, but allows for a third possibility: an atheist can authentically continue the
tradition of caritas just as many Christian believers, provided that relevant circum-
stances have changed significantly enough to justify his or her humanist re-
interpretation. Suppose, for instance, that for a long time caritas could only be justified
by reference to an extra-human entity. Due to philosophical innovation, however, it has
meanwhile become possible to justify caritas alternatively in a secular way. Under
contemporary philosophical circumstances, caritas could therefore legitimately and
authentically be rearticulated in terms of an atheist humanism (without ruling out Chris-
tian varieties). In other words, philosophical innovation might have made the once
presumably essential acknowledgment of God’s existence irrelevant for grasping the
true meaning of caritas.
Hence, the proposed model of tradition provides a sufficiently clear understanding of
why, how, and how much tradition materials may change; it succumbs to neither over- nor
under-inclusiveness; and it promises to be informative when applied to concrete cases.
What difference does the proposed model make to our understanding of the socially
valuable functions that traditions are supposed to serve? The following section addresses
this question by focusing in particular on the relationship of traditions and institutions.
Tradition and institutional modernization
The concept of a living tradition has several implications for a re-adjustment of Popper’s
sketch of a rational theory of tradition. The claim that traditions attune people’s beha-
viour, order and co-ordinate the social word, bring predictability, and thus facilitate
individual and collective rational action, must be relativized. Traditions certainly allow
recipients to gain deliberative efficiency, as they need not develop beliefs (or customs,
etc.) for every aspect of social life all by themselves. Furthermore, traditions foster
contiguity in ways of thinking and acting, as well as feelings of identification and
historical embeddedness among recipients and their respective tradents. Yet among the
members of one generation and across generations of recipients, traditions are as likely
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to create a shared horizon of understanding and similarity in behaviour as they are prone
to provoke alterity, schisms, and alienation.
The absence of uniformity in ways of thinking and acting among the members of a
tradition also gives rise to doubts that traditions serve as unproblematic stabilizers for
institutions through animating individuals to run them in accordance with their prima
facie social purposes. At least in addition to the stabilization function, the concept of a
living tradition underpins the idea that also the heterogeneity of tradition materials
among the members of one generation of recipients, and endogenous change of tradition
materials over time, serve a valuable function for the maintenance of a society’s insti-
tutional order.
To see why this might be so, recall that institutions share many similarities with
tradition materials: they also present or imply patterns or images of actions and the
beliefs requiring, recommending, regulating, permitting, or prohibiting the re-
enactment of those patterns (cf. Popper, 1972: 133; Shils, 1981: 20). But two important
differences can be discerned. First, it is not constitutive of institutions that they are the
subjects of transmission processes. And, second, the patterns of actions presented by
institutions take a solidified and centrally organized form. Institutions embody juridified
patterns of action, and manage and organize compliance. For reasons of clarity, one may
thus speak of social traditions and legal institutions. Institutionalized patterns of action
can be inventions or the material of a tradition. The Catholic Church, for instance, can be
regarded as an attempt to institutionalize the Christian teaching. In such cases of insti-
tutionalized traditions, the ways of thinking and acting called for by a tradition material
are centrally interpreted and legally fixed, yet – and this is the decisive point – the
tradition does not cease to persist, flourish, and reproduce its material in a heterogeneous
manner throughout the transmission process. The tradition lives on, whereas institutions
are born dead. By way of having its material handed down, received, and adapted to
changing circumstances, the tradition permanently presses for re-institutionalization; it
counteracts the finality proclaimed by legal fixation and thus counteracts political closure.
As the tradition does not speak with one voice, it is not itself a decision-making procedure.
Rather, it serves as a decentralized data-gathering system that informs policy-making about
perceived needs and available options for the modernization of established institutions.
Consider, for example, the interplay of the tradition and institution of marriage in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The pattern of engaging in a marital relationship was the
material of a tradition in Germany long before its first fixation and legal explication in
1949. The law, then, defined marriage as a life-long monogamous relationship among
adults of different sex. It thus made room for some social practices of marriage pre-
scribed by certain branches of the tradition, but obviously not all of them, such as life-
long monogamous relationships among persons of the same sex. In the last two decades,
the proposal to open the legal institution of marriage to persons of the same sex has
gained momentum. In public discourse, this proposal is commonly understood as eman-
cipatory and ‘anti-traditional’, and, in the eyes of its advocates, justified by the principle
of non-discrimination. However, same-sex inclusive marriage can be perfectly grasped
in terms of the authentic continuation of the tradition of marriage, despite its previous
heterosexual requirement, and even among those tradition branches that consider mutual
care, romance, and economic risk-sharing to be of secondary relevance to producing and
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raising descendants. In other words, changing external circumstances such as biomedical
innovations increasingly suggest that same-sex inclusive marriage is an adequate ‘timely
update’ (cf. Beckstein 2014, 32) of the original tradition material. After all, heterosexual
intercourse is no longer a necessary condition for fertilization, and the nutritional quality
of infant formulas has immensely improved, such that breast-feeding is no longer strictly
necessary. The sex of spouses is largely irrelevant to the success or failure of marriages
that are justified in relation to the function of reproduction.
Of course, opponents of same-sex inclusive marriage are likely to object to this
argument by making one of the following two claims. They might argue that circum-
stances have not yet changed sufficiently enough to marginalize the biological differ-
ences between man and woman. However, they would thus accept the provided account
of a living tradition along with its modernization function and implicitly admit that times
will at some point be ripe for same-sex inclusive marriage. Sooner or later, according to
this objection, authentic adherents of the tradition of marriage will have to consider the
sex of spouses an anachronistic criterion, and when the time has come will have to be
determined by the medical sciences, not philosophers, the citizenry, or politicians. Alter-
natively, they might go further and assert that circumstances cannot possibly change
sufficiently to legitimize the extension of marriage to same-sex couples because mar-
riage is essentially a union between one man and one woman. In this case, however, it
would be insufficient to invoke empirically observable biological (and social) difference
between the sexes and the risk of leaving the argumentative terrain that can be covered
by public reason would be high.20
Conclusion
The present article started out from the observation that scholarship on the functions and
normativity of traditions often stays on shaky conceptual grounds. Considering different
models of tradition, I have suggested that a model of living tradition, which allows
tradition materials to diverge intra- and inter-generationally, sits more easily within a
rational theory of tradition than a static model that requires homogeneity. Contrary to
what Hobsbawm (1983: 1) suggested at the very beginning of his famous article, a
tradition’s continuity with the past need not be broken or be factitious if recipients give
the tradition material a novel form. To specify and justify a model of living tradition, I
have argued that causal equivalence is a more convincing criterion for the authentic
continuation of a tradition than causal similarity.
This conception of tradition, I believe, provides a more solid basis for future inquiries
into the functions and normativity of traditions than the accounts that have, sometimes in
sketchy shape, informed earlier analyses. Adopting it suggests that we must relativize the
function, frequently attributed to traditions, of attuning people’s ways of thinking and
acting. Moreover, working in the opposite direction of Popper’s argument that traditions
motivate individuals to run institutions in accordance with their prima facie purposes, we
have seen that disagreement among adherents nurtures deliberative processes of policy-
making and expedites institutional reform. Living traditions thus serve as catalysts, even
though not quite as drivers (as Hayek’s and MacIntyre’s respective theories of cultural
evolution suggest21), for processes of re-institutionalization.
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When illustrating this modernization function and equivalence criterion with the
examples of marriage and caritas, we touched upon the difficulties associated with the
assessment of social disputes over the authentic continuation of a tradition. The proposed
account does of course not, by itself, resolve these disputes. It cannot tell us whether this
or that tradition managed to persist as one tradition despite (synchronically or diachro-
nically) heterogeneous tradition materials, or whether it has effectively split into one
faithful tradition and heretical sects, or whether it was completely abandoned. Empirical
assessment of the specific traditions and changed circumstances is needed. Yet, the
conception of a living tradition can guide this empirical assessment in at least three
relevant ways. First, it helps to reject claims as to the exclusive true inheritance of a
tradition; principles such as the ‘Extra ecclesiam nulla salus’ are ruled out. Because of
the polysemic nature of tradition materials it is always possible that two or more recep-
tions are equally faithful to the original.
Second, it casts doubts on verbatim reproductions of an earlier generation’s inter-
pretation of a tradition material. A tradition is authentically continued only if the causal
equivalence criterion is met. A disputant’s proposal must be a timely update of the
original version. His or her version of the tradition material must counterbalance
circumstantial changes and thus have the same prima facie purpose in his or her world,
what the original version had in the respective contexts of living of earlier faithful
members and the founder of the tradition. The conservative imperative inherent in
traditions calls for keeping the transmitted set of beliefs (or customs, etc.) in step with
changing external conditions. Since our world is characterized by an abundance of
complexity, there will of course be uncertainty about which relevant circumstances
have changed, and how substantial these changes are. Yet, adopting the conception of
living tradition reminds us that verbatim reproductions of a tradition material imply the
claim that relevant circumstances have not changed at all, which, in many situations,
will not be particularly convincing.
Finally, the conception of a living tradition suggests that counterfactual approval is
not a particularly relevant strategy for determining the genuine prima facie purpose of a
tradition material. Not infrequently, rivals in disputes over authenticity suggest that the
best way to find out whether X or Y is a true inheritor of, say, the Christian, Communist,
or Hegelian tradition is to consider what Jesus, Marx, or Hegel would say upon coming
back to life (Lebens, 2013a, 2013b). The proposed conception of living tradition sug-
gests that we should not care too much about counterfactual approval. For one, these
tradition founders might know better than anybody else what their teachings originally
meant, but have not experienced how the world has changed since. Resurrecting them
from the dead does not accomplish the task of counterbalancing developments that have
occurred in the meantime. On the other hand, tradition founders, even though they are the
authors of the tradition material, are not interpretive sovereigns. Recipients necessarily
play a co-constitutive role in the determination of meaning. The founder of a tradition,
even if resurrected from the dead, could not do the thinking for us. Perhaps, therefore, it
is a good way to say that starting a tradition, tradition founders bestow a path-dependent
mandate upon recipients to re-interpret and update their original set of beliefs (or cus-
toms, etc.), and in this sense pass the baton for the tradition material along with the
tradition material itself.
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Notes
1. For the second and third aspect, see especially Scheffler (2010: 291). For the last two aspects,
see especially Marsh (2012) and Nyı´ri (1995).
2. By authenticity, I understand ‘the quality or fact of accurately reflecting a model or exemplar’,
for instance, the condition of an idea or practice of being true to some earlier belief, custom, or
teaching. My understanding follows the Oxford English Dictionary online edition’s entry on
‘authenticity’ (3d), available at: http://www.oed.com/ (accessed November 17, 2015).
3. See, in particular, the recent debate over traditions and true successors in the Social Episte-
mology Review and Reply Collective: available at: http://social-epistemology.com/2014/08/
09/true-succession-and-inheritance-of-traditions-looking-back-on-the-debate-john-williams/
(accessed January 26, 2016). See also Freeden (1998: 324) and Ta¨nnsjo¨ (1990: 47).
4. For Popper’s conversation with Hayek and Oakeshott on traditions, see Birner (2014) and
Jacobs and Tregenza (2013).
5. Popper appears to approve of the ‘traditionality hypothesis’, according to which human
cognition cannot step outside of formed ways of thinking. For an exposition and a discussion
of this hypothesis, see Annas (1989) and Dittmann (2004: 38, 140–1).
6. Shil’s insight reveals a shortcoming in Hobsbawm’s (1983: 2–3) understanding of tradition
that equates symbolizations of tradition materials (e.g. a watch, a judge’s robe and wig) with
the tradition material itself.
7. This conclusion conforms to Hobsbawm’s understanding of invented traditions. According to
Hobsbawm (1983: 2), the peculiarity of invented traditions is that their inauguration comes
along with a (factitious) reference to a historic past.
8. However, what Hobsbawm (1983: 2) terms ‘custom’ comes close to the second model of
tradition (‘living tradition’).
9. Early traditionalist critics of Enlightenment rationalism defended the consecration of the
status quo by making an explicit analogy to the Christian tradition. Doubting the truth of the
Christian tradition is a manifestation of apostasy, Bonald argued. Questioning ‘natural’ tradi-
tions that maintain the estate-based society, he continued, amounts to political atheism.
Cf. Spaemann (1998: 151).
10. The term ‘living tradition’ is also common in Christian theology. In Catholic thought, how-
ever, the ‘living’ nature of (the Christian) tradition is typically associated with the on-going
revelation of the Word of God through the Holy Spirit. See e.g. Casarella (2015: 221–2).
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Ottati’s (1984) Calvinist-inspired account of Christianity as living tradition comes closer to
the model presented in Figure 3.
11. Among the more important aspects not reflected in Figure 3 is the possibility that a recipient
receives the tradition material (e.g. Hegelianism) from more than one source.
12. For the distinction of internal and external perspectives on traditions, see Ruben (2014).
Dworkin (1986: 13) elaborated on this distinction in the context of legal questions.
13. Weber warns against ‘purely transcendental examinations’ that ‘operat[e] aloof from the world they
seek to address’, and argues that the composition and expectations of relevant audiences must not be
left out of consideration. I will return to the empirical assessment of claims made in disputes over
authenticity in the Conclusion. Suffice it to say that my aim in this respect is primarily to develop a
formal conception of (the authentic continuation of a) tradition that is acceptable both from an
‘external’ as well as an ‘internal’ perspective, i.e. observers and adherents of particular traditions.
14. Note that this reception theoretical view of the pre-structured nature of tradition materials does
not coincide with the Traditionskern of moderate versions of the static model of a tradition.
Ambiguities and vagueness affect all aspects (i.e. a–E in the aforementioned example) of a
tradition material, even though perhaps not in equal measure.
15. In full, the definition of true inheritance of a tradition I refer to reads:
Y is a true inheritor of a tradition T iff (i) there is some X that originates T; (ii) SX and SY
stand on opposite ends of a chain of SS (which may include only SX and SY); (iii) each link Sn
is developed after Sn-1; (iv) each link Sn is qualitatively similar, to a very high degree, to Sn-1;
and (v) the holder of Sn develops Sn because the holder of Sn-1 develops Sn-1.
16. I refrain from recounting the ship-of-Theseus problems that loom ahead at this point.
17. Ta¨nnsjo¨ (1990) also embraces the qualitative similarity criterion in his discussion of tradition-
alism, admits its over-inclusiveness and suggests a democratic vote by the people concerned to
decide disputes. I doubt that this leads very far. Disputants who are allowed to be judges in their
own case must be expected to opt for their own respective version of the tradition material. The
decisive criterion for authentic continutation of a tradition would be the quantity of adherents:
The upshot of this is that no precise, abstract characterization of traditionalism can be made.
The concept has deliberately been cast in vague terms. But how are we, in a particular political
context, to resolve the vagueness? The standard solution is as follows. When assessing a
suggested political reform we have to decide whether it is faithful to a well-established existing
idiom of conduct or not. This is a matter of identity. Would the suggested reform exchange one
idiom for another, or would it preserve an existing idiom, possibly enhancing it? Well, who is
to tell? The people concerned; I think the conservative ought to answer. To be sure, any
suggested reform would preserve some traits of some existing idiom while changing others.
Identity is never a matter of exact similarity. Whether two different states of some institution,
say, are states of the same institution or not, depends on whether certain relevant similarities
and other relations (where certain causal ones are especially important) hold between the two
states. What similarities and what other relations, then, are relevant? This is what has to be
decided by the people concerned by a suggested reform. (Ta¨nnsjo¨, 1990: 47)
18. Rudimentary articulations of this criterion can arguably be found in MacIntyre (1998: 350–5)
and Ottati (1984: 82, 86).
19. I am grateful to [Robert E. Goodin] for drawing my attention to the test US courts applied to
determine whether atheists could qualify as conscientious objectors to war and be excused
from conscription.
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20. For a sophisticated argument along these lines, see Girgis, Anderson and George (2012), who
argue that same-sex couples are ineligible for marriage because their sexual intercourse lacks
a dynamism toward procreation. For a critique, see Macedo (2015: 41–3).
21. For Hayek, see Voigt (1991). For MacIntyre, see Milibank (2015) and Porter (2003: 52).
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